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Abstract  
The privilege in the operating system (OS) often results in the break of confidentiality and integrity of the system. To 
solve this problem, several security mechanisms are proposed, such as Role-based Access Control, Separation of 
Duty. However, these mechanisms can not eliminate the privilege in OS kernel layer. This paper proposes a 
Separation of Three Powers Architecture (STPA). The authorizations in OS are divided into three parts: System 
Management Subsystem (SMS), Security Management Subsystem (SEMS) and Audit Subsystem (AS). Mutual 
support and mutual checks and balances which are the design principles of STPA eliminate the administrator in the 
kernel layer. Furthermore, the paper gives the formal description for authorization division using the graph theory. 
Finally, the implementation of STPA is given. Proved by experiments, the Separation of Three Powers Architecture 
we proposed can provide reliable protection for the OS through authorization division. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1.  Introduction 
Privilege [1] is used to control the most important resources and functions, such as user accounts 
management, software installation, system shutdown. If these privileges are misused, the security of the 
operating system (OS) will be greatly threatened. Therefore, in many mainstream OS, such as Linux and 
Windows, most privileges are denied to users except the administrator. However, once the administrator's 
permission is stolen or the administrator makes an incorrect decision with experiences, the confidentiality 
and integrity of the OS will be broken. 
In current OS, users always logon the system as an administrator for convenience. This pattern of 
logon has several disadvantages. First, the user can access any of the resources, including modifying the 
audit log, because the administrator owns the whole system. Furthermore, the malicious program will run 
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by inheriting the administrator’s privileges. Compared with the ordinary user logon, this can easily cause 
security accidents. 
During software installation, the new executable file may replace or remove the original. So the user 
must logon the system as an administrator. At this moment, if a virus or Trojan is activated, it may 
maliciously tamper legal programs. However, it is hard for the existing security mechanisms to 
distinguish the malicious operations from the legal. 
To solve these problems, this paper proposes a new Separation of Three Powers Architecture (STPA) 
for the OS in the kernel layer. We divide all the authorizations into three parts with the mutual support 
and mutual checks and balances principle. 
2. RELATED WORK 
2.1 Least Privilege [2,3] 
Every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary 
to complete the job. Primarily, the least privilege principle limits the damage that can result from an 
accident or error. It also reduces the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to the 
minimum for correct operation, so that unintentional, unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less 
likely to occur [4].
2.2 Role-Based Access Control 
The central notion of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [5,6,7] is that users do not have 
discretionary access to enterprise objects. Instead, access permissions are administratively made members 
of appropriate roles. The principle greatly simplifies management of authorization while providing an 
opportunity for great flexibility in specifying and enforcing enterprise-specific protection policies. 
2.3 Separation of Duty 
Separation of duty (SoD) [8,9] is that there is no subjects who can gain all the privileges to complete a 
task. Based on analysis of the relationship between the main features of the role, Kuhn points out that one 
means of implementing SoD policies is with mutual exclusion of roles [10,11]. Cai pointed out that SoD 
could eliminate the implicit authorization [12]. 
However, these studies have overlooked an important fact that neither controlling the process 
permissions nor dividing the administrator to several exclusive roles can eliminate the privileges in OS 
kernel layer completely. For example, a malicious program will have all the permissions on the system 
configuration, if it gets the administrator permission through the buffer overflow. 
3. The Separation of Three Powers Architecture 
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Figure 1. The Separation of Three Powers Architecture 
The Separation of Three Powers Architecture is composed with three subsystems and two trust agents 
(Fig 1). The administrator is removed from STPA. And the user logons the system is called operator. The 
authorization is divided into three parts: System Management Subsystem (SMS), Security Management 
Subsystem (SEMS), Audit Subsystem (AS) (Fig1,ķĸĹ). The SMS solves the problem that what is in 
the OS. It is responsible for the resource management and the identification of the subjects. The SEMS 
makes decision about whether the access request obeys the security policies. The AS records the 
information of every operation in detail. 
The Upper Trusted Agent (UTA) and the Lower Trusted Agent (LTA) are added to the traditional OS 
kernel. The UTA hooks system calls from the application layer. For some software work in the OS kernel, 
such as antivirus software, many operations are issued directly from the OS kernel. Therefore, the LTA 
hooks the request form the driver to the kernel layer. 
3.1 The Components of STPA 
1) System Management Subsystem. The SMS is constructed with five modules: Trusted Measurement, 
Trusted Isolation, Trusted Services, Trusted Standard Library and Trusted Decision. The SMS manages the 
hardware configuration, the software information and user identity. All these information is stored in 
Trusted Standard Library. Based on these information, the SMS does the measuring work with the Trusted 
Measurement module for the subjects, including users and processes. Trusted Isolation and Trusted 
Services provide the corresponding functions for the applications, such as isolation and encryption. 
2) Security Management Subsystem. The SEMS mainly determine whether the access request meets 
the security policy. It is constructed with four modules: Access Control, Security Isolation, Security Policy 
and Security Decision.
3) Audit Subsystem. The AS is responsible for recording the behaviors of the OS, and auditing the 
work of SMS and SEMS.
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3.2  The Authorization Model in STPA 
Figure 2. The components of STPA 
SMS
A
B
SEMS AS
Figure 3. The authorization mapping 
The SMS, SEMS and AS compose the authorization of STPA (Fig 2). If we put the three subsystems 
into a plane A, their corresponding authorizations are mapped to another plane B (Fig 3). Plane B is 
called Authorization Plane (AP). We use the vertex to denote the authorization. The authorizations of the 
three subsystems are written as SMSn, SEMSn and ASn. When an access request arrives, the request 
must go through a series of authorizations, such as user identification, integrity check of the process, 
access control, audit. Connect the vertexes in AP with sequence, a directed graph is constructed. The 
graph is written as authorization graph (AG) (Fig 4). 
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Figure 4. The authorization graph 
Rule 1  If the STPA goes through some authorizations for an access request, the procedure constructs a 
graph AG1 (V1,E1). AG1 must be the sub-graph of AG and it satisfies: 
     )z)z)z nnn ASVSEMSVSMSV  111
This rule shows that any request access must be constrained by the three authorization subsystems. 
That is to say, no subsystem can determine whether the request is legal or not by itself. 
Rule 2  AG is a directed acyclic graph. 
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Let AG is a cyclic graph, the authorization would always go back to a certain vertex. The other 
vertexes are dispensable. In other words, one subsystem can make decision for the access request. That 
breaches the Separation of Three Powers rule. Therefore, AG is a directed acyclic graph. 
Rule3   ,,, nASmifVnm  tmAStthen n o
If there is a path a to b, it is written as bao . The rule illuminates that all the operations will be 
audited by the audit subsystem. Besides, it shows that the other two subsystems are monitored by the 
audit subsystem. The mutual checks and balances principle in STPA is also revealed. 
Rule 4  There is no identical vertexes in AG. 
If there is not an error in division of the subsystems, any two subsystems will not have the same 
authorization. 
3.3 Security Analysis 
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Figure 5. The authorization in traditional OS and STPA 
Things which are closely related to the OS security can be defined into three parts: which are the legal 
parts in system, how the OS runs and how to record the operations in detail. Different from the traditional 
OS with only one administrator, the authorizations in the STPA are divided into three parts in the OS 
kernel (Fig 5). The relationship among these three subsystems is mutual support and mutual checks and 
balances. The administrator privileges are separated effectively. 
To illustrate the advantages of STPA, we take the buffer overflow attack and software installation for 
example. 
4) Buffer Overflow Attack 
Assume that a hacker makes a buffer overflow in traditional OS. The stack pointer points to a 
malicious program V.EXE which is implanted to the system beforehand. Once V.EXE started, it can 
easily infect other executable programs or steal confidential information in system. However, in the 
STPA, the SMS will first check the legitimacy of V.EXE with the signature or the checksum value. And 
the SEMS will determine whether the access requests of V.EXE meet security policy. Any of the two 
subsystems can prevent the damage of V.EXE. Finally, the AS will record the access requests and the 
results. Thus, the STPA will prevent buffer overflow attacks to some extent. 
5) Software Installation 
By using the trust process tree [13], we can get the software package information, including the names 
and checksum value of all executable files. This information is updated to the Trusted Standard Library of 
SMS. 
During the software installation, while the SMS makes sure the validation of the user and the 
executable files, the SEMS makes sure the package does not do the malicious operations. The AS records 
all the operations for the rollback caused by mistakes. 
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Any subsystem can not do all the authorizations for the installation. The installation will be completed 
if and only if all the behaviors are monitored by three subsystems. Therefore, the STPA reduces the risk of 
the malicious codes starting because of the administrator’s misjudgment. 
In a word, the advantages of STPA are as follows. 
1) Although RBAC divides the administrator into several roles, some privileged operations, such as 
software installation, still need some role like administrator to complete the task. There are not sufficient 
restrictions on this role. However, the STPA solves the problem at the kernel layer in OS and the 
privileges of administrator are completely removed. 
2) Even if one subsystem makes miscarriage of justice, the other two subsystems can still confirm the 
OS security. It not only reduces false positives caused by the administrator, but also prohibits the 
administrator’s illegal operation for some purposes. 
3) The STPA achieves the mutual constraints of the three subsystems. For example, the precondition 
of SEMS determining whether an access request is legal is that the SMS has checked the subject 
authenticity. Besides, all the behaviors are audited by the AS which has no access to the system resource 
except the audit log.
4. STPA Implementation 
According to the architecture in Figure 1, three subsystems are designed. In order to achieve the 
compatibility to the existing OS, the experiment is implemented on Windows 2003. We implement the 
functions of the STPA through a file system filter driver. 
4.1 SMS 
At initial state, each user was given a USB-KEY which is the unique identifier of user identification. 
White-list technology [14] is used to check the integrity of the hardware drivers and executable files. All 
of the executable files will be collected the checksum value with SHA1 algorithm. The data structure in 
white-list is (User,Fullpath,Hash). This established a correspondence between the user and the program. 
The SMS grants the permission that operator can run the program according to the security requirements. 
In the filter driver, call RegmonMapServiceTable to realize the hook function. When executable codes are 
loaded into memory, the request will be hooked by the filter driver. Then, the checksum value is 
calculated to check the integrity. 
In this way, the SMS is able to do the authentication work for the user, executable codes and drivers in 
OS. 
4.2 SEMS 
The security policy is recorded in a file. When the OS boots, the policy will be read form the file into 
the LIST_ENTRY in memory. 
Firstly, the access requests are got through the dispatch routine IRP_MJ_CREATE and 
IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION. Secondly, get the current process by call PsGetCurrentProcessId 
function. Thirdly, get the operation type through the DesiredAccess and Options in IRP. Finally, get the 
object through the FileObject structure. In this way, we get all three elements in access control. 
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4.3 AS 
The audit hook is mounted in the OS important control points, such as execute, read, write, rename, 
delete. The security related operations are recorded with structure 
(Time,User,Process,Objectpath,OperationResult,SMSResult,SEMSResult). Then, the records are inserted 
into the link-list in OS kernel. 
We call PsCreateSystemThread to create a kernel thread. Then, write the audit records to the log file 
using the thread. And the audit log is protected by the isolation mechanism, which can only be accessed 
by the AS. 
4.4 Performance 
Compared with the traditional OS, the influences of STPA mainly concentrate on three aspects: (1) 
Calculate the checksum value of the executable file (2) Access control (3) Write the audit log. Thus, we 
do the experiment on the installation of six typical software (Table 1). The configuration of the PC is 2GB 
RAM, 1.8GHz dual core CPU. By comparing the cost of the installation time, we get the efficiency of 
system decreased 5.1%. 
Table1 .Compare time cost on installation 
Software 
Name 
Software 
Version
Traditional
OS (s) 
OS with 
STPA (s) 
MSN 7.5.0324 56 58 
Kaspersky 9.0.0.736 171 183 
Office 2007 1102 1149 
Foxmail 6.5.021 55 59 
Photoshop CS2 9.0 267 284 
ACDSee 11.0.114 108 116 
5.  Conclusion 
Different from the Role-based Access Control, the privilege in the Separation of Three Powers 
Architecture is reasonably divided into three subsystems in the kernel of OS. Through the authorization 
graph, the paper gives a formal description of the relationship among the three subsystems. Mutual 
support and mutual checks and balances, which are the key factors in Separation of Three Powers 
Architecture, eliminate the administrator in the kernel layer. The architecture provides reliable protection 
for the whole OS running. 
Acknowledgment 
This work is partially supported by 863 National High Tech Research and Develop Plan Project 
#2009AA01Z437, 973 National Key Fundamental Research Development Plan Project #2007CB311100 
and Key Lab of Information Network Security, Ministry of Public Security. 
 Yu Li et al. /  Physics Procedia  25 ( 2012 )  1168 – 1175 1175
      
References 
[1]Charles Salemi. A Privilege Mechanism for UNIX System V Release 4 Operating Systems. Proceedings of the 1069 AFIPS 
Fall Joint Computer Conference, AFIPS Press, 1969, pp 119-133 
[2]K. Buyens, BD Win, and W. Joosen. Resolving least privilege violations in software architectures. In SESS'09: Proceedings 
of the 5th International Workshop on Software Engineering for Secure Systems, Vancouver, Canada, May 2009. 
[3]Levin, TE, Irvine, CE, and Nguyen, TD. A Least Privilege Model for Static Separation Kernels. Technical Report NPS-CS-
05-003, Center of Information Systems Security Studies and Research, Naval Postgraduate School, October 2004. 
[4]J.H. Saltzer and M.D. Schroeder. The Protection of Information in Computer Systems. Proc. IEEE, vol. 63, No. 9, 1975, 
pp.1278–1308. 
[5]Ferraiolo, Kuhn. Role-Based Access Control. 15th National Computer Security Conference. October 1992, pp.554–563. 
[6]Sandhu, R., Coyne, E.J., Feinstein, H.L. and Youman. Role-Based Access Control Models. IEEE Computer (IEEE Press) 29 
(2), August 1996. pp 38–47 
[7]D F Ferraiolo, J Cugini, D R Kuhn. Role-based access control (RBAC): Features and motivations [C]. In: Proc of the 11th 
Annual Computer Security Applications Conf. Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press , 1995, pp 241 – 248 
[8]R Simon , M E Zurko. Separation of duty in role-based environment [C]. In: Proc of the 10th Computer Security Foundations 
Workshop (CSFW’ 97). Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press , 1997, pp 183 – 194 
[9]Ravi Sandhu. Separation of Duties in Computerized Information Systems. In Proceedings of the IFIP WG11.3 Workshop on 
Database Security, Hal- ifax, UK, September18-21 1990. 
[10]D R Kuhn. Mutual exclusion of roles as a means of implementing separation of duty in role-based access control systems 
[C]. In: Proc of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control (RBAC’ 97). New York: ACM Press, 1997, pp 101 – 118 
[11]D. Jonscher. Extending access control with duties: realized by active mechanisms. In Workshop on Database Security. IFIP 
WG 11.3, 1992 
[12]Cai Jiayong, Qing Sihan, Liu Wei. Separation of Duty in Privileged Operating Systems [J]. Beijing: Institute of Software, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 45 (4), 2008, pp 666-676 
[13]LI Yu, ZHAO Yong, HAN Pei-sheng. A New OS Self-immune Model against Computer Viruses. Bejing: College of 
Computer Science and Technology, Beijing University of Technology. Journal of Beijing University of Technology, 2010 
[14]JM Winer. Globalization, Terrorist Finance and Global Conflict – Time for a White List? Springer Netherlands. 2003 
